APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Ashley Nicole Thomas, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition, in which she challenged her multiple convictions related to the sexual abuse of a child and her effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner maintains that her trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted Defendant, Tyrone McCurdy, of multiple counts of vandalism and theft, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-two years to be served in confinement as a persistent offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute between a property owner and her homeowners’ association. Appellant’s property is governed by the homeowner’s association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions. There are two improvements to appellant’s property, a main house and a carriage house, both of which were originally roofed with vintage concrete tiles. Appellant replaced the roof on the carriage house with asphalt shingles, but did not replace the roof on the main house. Rather, appellant had the main house roof cleaned, which resulted in a lighter appearance. The homeowners’ association demanded that appellant replace the main house roof with shingles to match the carriage house. Appellant refused and filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunction. The association filed a counter-complaint alleging that appellant was in breach of certain provisions of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed appellant’s declaratory judgment action on its finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because appellant failed to join all necessary parties. The trial court granted the homeowners’ association’s motion for summary judgment on its counter-complaint and awarded attorney’s fees. Because the trial court’s order does not adequately explain its reasons for dismissing appellant’s declaratory judgment action, we cannot conduct a meaningful review of that holding, and we vacate the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint. There are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and its award of attorney’s fees to the homeowner’s association.

In this divorce, the trial court sanctioned Husband for failing to participate in discovery. After a final hearing at which Husband failed to appear, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce that awarded Wife monetary judgments and alimony, divided the marital property, adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, and set child support. Husband filed a motion to set aside, alter, or amend the final decree, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Husband challenges the sanctions and complains that the trial court failed to consider the statutory best interest factors when fashioning the permanent parenting plan. Although the trial court’s factual findings concerning the children’s best interest are deficient, we can “soldier on” by conducting a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. After that review, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an order requiring a petitioner to pay a filing fee or face dismissal of his case. Because the order is not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

Following mediation, family members signed a settlement agreement resolving their business dispute. One party then sought to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court determined that the party’s ability to withdraw was limited and ordered him to close on the transactions contemplated by the agreement. Because we conclude that the settlement agreement’s language was ambiguous, we vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Gary Rollins, Defendant, was charged with one count of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in September of 2020.  At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury found Defendant not guilty of rape of a child but could not reach a verdict on the lesser-included offenses of rape of a child.  The jury could not reach a verdict on either count of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court granted a mistrial for the remaining lesser-included offenses of rape of a child and the two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  In a second trial on the same presentment, Defendant was again tried for rape of a child.  The jury found Defendant guilty of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery.  At sentencing, Defendant challenged the rape of a child conviction for the first time on the basis that it violated double jeopardy.  The trial court agreed, entering a judgment for the lesser-included offense of attempted rape of a child.  The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years for the attempted rape of a child conviction and fifteen years for each aggravated sexual battery conviction.  The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior bad act in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), that his second trial for rape of a child violated his right against double jeopardy, and that the trial court had no authority to modify the conviction on the jeopardy-barred offense to attempted rape of a child.  Because the Defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the attempted rape of a child absent the presence of the charge of rape of a child and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence of a prior bad act, we affirm the convictions.

A utility district sued a private corporation alleging that the corporation was illegally providing water services to customers in the utility district’s service area.  The trial court ruled in favor of the corporation.  On appeal, the district asserts that the trial court erred in requiring the district to prove that the company qualified as a “public utility” under the pertinent statute.  We have concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute.  We, therefore, reverse and remand. 

This appeal involves of the administration of an estate. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order closing the estate as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Mario Albanese, pleaded guilty to three counts of reckless aggravated
assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B) (2014) (subsequently
amended). The Hawkins County Criminal Court sentenced him to an agreed-upon, nineyear
sentence, suspended to probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in
denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Johnny Tate, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Tony Brasfield, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of violating the rules of community supervision for life, a Class A misdemeanor; and violating the sexual offender registry for failing to register or report in person within 48 hours of establishing or changing a primary or secondary residence, a Class E felony. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction of violating the sexual offender registry, arguing that a plain reading of the statute shows that the State failed to prove the essential elements of the offense. We agree with the Defendant. Accordingly, the Defendant’s misdemeanor conviction for violating community supervision is affirmed, but we reverse and vacate his felony conviction for violating the sexual offender registry.

Defendant, Nicholas Cornelius Conner, pled guilty to one count of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, a Schedule II drug. He received a nine-year community corrections sentence which was later transferred to probation. Thereafter, Defendant was arrested for new drug offenses. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation and by denying credit for time he successfully served on probation. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A homeowners’ association sued a resident for violations of neighborhood regulations. The resident did not answer requests for admission. The trial court found that the requests were, therefore, admitted and granted a judgment for the association. The resident appealed. We affirm.

Mother and Father entered into an Agreed Permanent Parenting Plan. Thereafter, Father learned of information he allegedly was not privy to before, namely, that the Mother’s new husband was physically abusive, had been using drugs, and has an extensive criminal record; additionally, new incidents involving domestic violence and other criminality occurred involving Mother’s new husband. In response, Father sought to modify the parenting plan. The Juvenile Court modified the plan, reducing the number of days of Mother’s visitation and limiting Mother to supervised visitation. Mother appeals the trial court’s modifications. We affirm.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found clear and convincing evidence to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home and (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We now affirm.

The Defendant, Kimberly M. Smart, was convicted by a Hamilton County Jury of reckless aggravated assault, for which she received a sentence of three years' incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement for impeachment, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a body camera recording depicting the victim shortly after she was stabbed, and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct by attempting to shift the burden of proof to the Defendant during closing and rebuttal arguments.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

A plaintiff was awarded a judgment against a defendant who failed to complete home improvement work. The defendant appeals; however, he has failed to provide an adequate record to allow for consideration of his arguments on appeal and has asked this court to perform fact-finding that is beyond the scope of our authority. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

This case involves allegations of malfeasance by several members of a family business against another member. The plaintiffs asserted both derivative and individual claims. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the merits of the case but vacate and remand the portion of the trial court’s decision regarding damages and attorney fees.

The Petitioner, Casey Lee Anderson, pled guilty to second degree murder and received a sentence of nineteen years’ imprisonment. He later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that the State had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a witness statement before he entered the plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief, finding that the State had violated Brady by failing to disclose the statement. On appeal, the State argues that the post-conviction court erred in granting relief, asserting that the Petitioner failed to prove that the statement was material. Upon our de novo review, we agree with the State. As such, we respectfully reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case to reinstate the Petitioner’s conviction.

The Petitioner, Bryant Ward, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, in exchange for a twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was on a medication that inhibited his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Plaintiff sued Defendant for divorce. Defendant appeals challenging the trial court’s failure to award alimony. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, appellate courts presume the record supports the trial court’s findings. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Victor Valle, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of twenty-two years imprisonment. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In relevant part, the Petitioner alleged that his attorneys were ineffective by (1) calling the victim’s mother and his former spouse as witnesses at trial; (2) failing to explain his right to testify and advising him not to testify; and (3) failing to advise him of his right to have the jury instructed regarding lesser-included offenses. The Petitioner also asserted that he was entitled to relief due to cumulative error. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Derek Morse, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of three counts of premeditated first degree murder and one count of attempted premeditated first degree murder.  Defendant was sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder convictions, and he was ordered to serve a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for the attempted first degree murder conviction.  In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the State failed to establish his identity as a shooter; 2) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior bad act; 3) the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for evidence of gunshot residue on Defendant's clothing; 4) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; 5) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on proof that a State's witness gave false testimony that he did not receive favorable treatment from the State for his testimony against Defendant; 6) the State made improper comments during its opening statement and closing argument; and 7) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles Defendant to a new trial.  Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against seven defendants. Their complaint asserted various counts arising out of the defendants’ involvement with a water loss claim the plaintiffs had reported to their insurer. Four of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted their motions and simply stated at the end of its order of dismissal, “This is a final and appealable order and there is no just cause for delay.” The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. This Court entered two show cause orders, directing the appellants to either obtain a final judgment or show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. We then entered an order deferring the matter to the panel of the Court deciding this appeal. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss this appeal.