APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This post-divorce appeal arises from competing petitions to modify a parenting plan and a petition for criminal contempt. At the time of the divorce, Brandy Leigh Frame Taylor2 (“Mother”) and Joseph Daniel Taylor (“Father”) adopted a parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding Father visitation. The child was four years old at the time of the divorce. Five years later, the then nine-year-old child purportedly began refusing to visit Father. Thereafter, Mother petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, stop all visitation with Father. Father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan to, inter alia, name him the primary residential parent. Father also filed a contempt petition alleging, in relevant part, that Mother intentionally and repeatedly obstructed his visitation and coached the child to refuse to visit Father. After a two-day hearing in which the trial court found Father was a credible witness and Mother was not credible, the court determined that a material change in circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s severe alienation of the child from Father and that a drastic modification of the parenting plan was in the child’s best interest. The court’s modifications of the parenting plan included designating Father as the primary residential parent with sole decision-making authority, reducing Mother’s parenting time to what Father had been awarded in the previous order, and restricting Mother to supervised visitation pending a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 35 psychological evaluation. In a separate order, the court found Mother guilty of seventy-one counts of criminal contempt for willfully violating the parties’ visitation schedule and sentenced Mother to serve concurrent ten-day terms in jail for six of the seventy-one acts of contempt but suspended the sixty-day sentence except for the service of three weekends on the condition that Mother strictly adhere to the court’s orders going forward. Mother appeals the modification of the parenting plan and the trial court’s seventy-one criminal contempt findings. Both parties challenge the sentence imposed for Mother’s criminal contempt. We affirm. Father also requests his attorney’s fees on appeal. We find Father’s request to be well taken and remand for a determination of Father’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

The Petitioner, Jacquet Moore, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his conviction of aggravated rape and resulting sentence of sixty years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Petitioner claims, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred by denying his amended petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief as to one of the Petitioner’s grounds for relief but that the case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his remaining grounds. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jerry Buckner, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (unlawful firearm possession).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve concurrent sentences of forty years for second degree murder and twenty years for the firearm possession.  On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the defense of self-defense.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of a clerical error on the judgment for the firearm conviction.

The Defendant, Jennifer Ruth Barber, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s probation revocation of her eight-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine.  On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve her sentence.  We affirm the court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, acting pro se, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of error coram nobis, claiming that Judge Donald H. Allen erred by summarily dismissing the petition while Petitioner’s motion to recuse Judge Joseph T. Howell was pending. We conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. However, we remand for Judge Howell to enter a written order granting the recusal motion.

Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

After being convicted of several drug offenses, Charles R. Johnson, Petitioner, was sentenced to an effective thirty-year sentence.  State v. Johnson, No. E2021-01106-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 3535344, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 18, 2023), no perm. app. filed.  Petitioner's direct appeal was unsuccessful.  He sought post-conviction relief by filing a pro se petition in which he argued that trial counsel was ineffective and that his due process rights were violated in various ways.  The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition without appointment of counsel.  On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly dismissed the petition.  After a review, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of Petitioner's standalone due process claims.  However, we reverse and remand the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel without appointment of counsel or a hearing.  Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  On remand, the post-conviction court should appoint counsel for Petitioner, allow Petitioner to amend his pro se petition, and hold a hearing on the petition.

The appellant, Ann Blankenship d/b/a Ann Blankenship Bonding, appeals her suspension from writing bonds in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District due to her failure to comply with the applicable statutes. Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral argument, we affirm that decision of the trial court.

This is an appeal arising from a decision by the Tennessee Board of Nursing (“the Board”)
to revoke a registered nurse’s license after she retrieved the wrong medication from an
automatic dispenser and administered it to a hospital patient, resulting in the patient’s
death. The Tennessee Department of Health (“the Department”) brought an initial
complaint against the nurse concerning the incident, which it first determined did not merit
further action but then later re-opened. Simultaneously, the nurse faced criminal
prosecution and was ultimately convicted of two criminal charges related to the incident.
Following a contested hearing in the administrative proceedings, the Board revoked the
nurse’s license. The nurse sought judicial review of this decision pursuant to Tennessee’s
Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. During the judicial review proceeding, the nurse
raised, for the first time, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as affirmative
defenses to the Department’s complaint. In response, the Board argued that the nurse had
waived these affirmative defenses because she had failed to raise them during the
administrative proceedings. While the petition for judicial review remained pending, the
criminal case moved to the sentencing phase. A doctor, who had testified as an expert
witness in both the contested administrative proceeding and the criminal case, wrote a letter
of support for the nurse to the criminal court judge in preparation for her sentencing. When
the nurse learned of the doctor’s supportive letter, she moved the trial court to remand the
instant case to the Board so that the Board could consider the contents of the letter in its
decision. The trial court declined to remand the matter to the Board or to allow the nurse
to present the letter to the Board as additional evidence. The trial court subsequently
entered a final order, determining that the nurse had not waived the affirmative defenses of
res judicata or judicial estoppel but declining to reverse the Board’s decision on those
grounds. The trial court then affirmed the Board’s decision to revoke the nurse’s license.
The nurse has appealed. Upon review, we determine that the nurse waived the affirmative
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel because she failed to present those doctrines
during the administrative proceedings  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
determination concerning waiver of those defenses. In all other respects, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Antonio Gipson, of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the trial court imposed a sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder. He also asserts that the trial court erred by (1) finding that prior threats made by the victim were hearsay; and (2) excluding a video of the victim displaying a firearm in the weeks before the shooting. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Bryant Donaldson, Jr, pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and six counts of aggravated statutory rape, with the trial court to determine the manner and length of sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective twenty-three-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his psychosexual evaluation and a victim impact statement at sentencing and that the trial court misapplied enhancement factors. Upon our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Dale Merritt, appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael Dunford, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for two counts
of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received an
effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove his identity as the perpetrator and that the trial court erred by imposing
a longer sentence than the minimum in-range sentence of twelve years. Following our
review, we affirm.

When Daniel Barillas failed to appear for a scheduled court appearance, the trial court entered a conditional forfeiture against Mr. Barillas and Bail U Out Bonding (“Bail U Out”). Bail U Out moved for exoneration of the bail bond, claiming that Mr. Barillas had been deported. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the full amount of the bond. After a thorough review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment.

The pro se Petitioner, Jamauri Ransom, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s order granting the State of Mississippi’s request that he be extradited to Mississippi on a murder indictment.  We conclude that the Petitioner has waived consideration of his claim regarding the alleged invalidity of the extradition paperwork by failing to include an adequate record for appellate review.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Property owners retained a licensed engineer to develop subdivision lots. As partial compensation for his services, the engineer agreed to accept a 6% share of the gross proceeds when the lots were sold. The agreement was to be binding on the property owners’ heirs and assigns. After both owners died, ownership of the remaining unsold lots passed to a daughter through probate. She sold some of the lots without payment of the engineer’s 6% share. The engineer sued the daughter for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Among other things, the daughter argued that the engineer’s action was barred by the probate statutes. The trial court held that the engineer’s 6% share was secured by a statutory lien on the real property and its proceeds and that such lien was not subject to any affirmative defenses. After careful review, we reverse.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her daughter, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant filed a civil summons in the general sessions court, asserting that items she had pawned at one of the appellee’s locations were returned to her damaged. After the appellant failed to appear at the initial hearing, the matter was dismissed. The appellant appealed the dismissal to the circuit court, which found that the appeal was not timely filed and dismissed the appeal. On appeal in this Court, we have determined that the appellant’s brief is deficient under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Julian Summers, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a corpse. As the thirteenth juror, the trial court affirmed the verdicts as to the first degree murder and abuse of a corpse but dismissed the verdict as to tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus two years. On appeal, Defendant claims that 1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his video-recorded statement to the police; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to call the forensic evaluator as a rebuttal witness; 3) the evidence was insufficient to support his first degree murder conviction; and 4) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alonzo Hoskins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2019 convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to request a post-trial inquiry into a juror who had expressed difficulty hearing portions of the trial. The State counters that the post-conviction court correctly denied relief. Based on our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Due to numerous deficiencies in the petition, the appeal is hereby dismissed.

This appeal arises out of a petition filed by Roger and Regina Judd (collectively, “Appellants”) seeking grandparent visitation with three minor children, Appellants’ grandchildren. Kaylee and Spencer Powell (collectively, “Appellees”) filed their answer to the petition, claiming that Appellants lacked standing to bring their request. The Putnam County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) dismissed Appellants’ petition for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Humphreys County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Tabitha P. (“Mother”) and Cody T. (“Father”) to their minor child Gabriel T. (“the Child”). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on several grounds. Mother and Father appeal, arguing mainly that DCS failed to assist or communicate with them. The Juvenile Court determined that Mother and Father were not credible witnesses, a determination we leave undisturbed. We find that each ground for termination found by the Juvenile Court was proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm.

This is an appeal of a denial of unemployment benefits. The issue presented is whether, under Tennessee’s unemployment statutes, an employee who gives her employer notice of her resignation as of a certain date and is terminated by the employer prior to the effective resignation date is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits on the ground that the employee voluntarily quit. The trial court affirmed the agency’s decision denying benefits. Based upon the plain language of the relevant statutory provision, we conclude that the employee’s actions do not constitute a voluntary decision to quit. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.

Rhonda L. (“Mother”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for the City of Bristol (“the Juvenile Court”) to modify a parenting plan granting Mark K. (“Father”) sole custody of Kendin L. (“the Child”) and Mother at least four days of parenting time each month.1 Father filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking the suspension of Mother’s parenting time based upon Mother’s persistent inappropriate behavior and psychological evaluation results. The Juvenile Court entered an ex parte order granting the motion for injunctive relief. After trial, the Juvenile Court dismissed Mother’s petition for her failure to prosecute and ordered that the suspension of Mother’s parenting time remain in full effect until Mother engaged in therapy and treatment for her personality disorder. Mother appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.