APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“the Act”), wherein he sought DNA testing of evidence related to his first degree murder conviction. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Espiridion Evangelista Kolimlim, III, appeals the criminal court’s dismissal of his general sessions appeal from payment of a traffic citation after he filed a motion to withdraw payment of the citation. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we dismiss the appeal.

A father appeals the modification of a parenting plan. Because the order appealed does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal concerns a divorce. Larry Mark Mangum (“Husband”) sued Laney Celeste Mangum (“Wife”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court entered its final judgment, which Wife appealed. In Mangum v. Mangum, No. E2018-00024-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1787328 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 24, 2019) (“Mangum I”), we vacated the Trial Court’s judgment except as to the divorce itself. We remanded with instructions for the Trial Court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law that consider all of the relevant and applicable statutory factors guiding child custody and property division matters, respectively. On remand, the Trial Court entered a new final judgment in light of our Opinion in Mangum I. Wife appeals, arguing that the Trial Court erred in fashioning the permanent parenting plan concerning the parties’ two minor sons (“the Children”) as well as in its classification, valuation, and division of the parties’ property. Husband raises the separate issue of whether this appeal is frivolous. We find that the Trial Court, in considering all of the relevant statutory factors, complied with our instructions on remand. We find, inter alia, that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings with respect to its application of the statutory factors.

The defendant, Adam Holmes, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a Cellebrite cellular telephone data extraction report and the prior testimony of a State witness and by permitting a State witness to testify remotely. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Elijah Bowman, was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twelve years. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions of first-degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. We affirm.

Narcotics officers seized two vehicles and approximately $23,000 in U.S. currency while executing a search warrant at a residence. An administrative law judge ordered the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security to return the seized property to the purported owner. The judge determined that the search warrant was issued without probable cause, resulting in an illegal seizure. And, if not, the Department failed to prove that it strictly complied with the forfeiture statutes. The Department petitioned for judicial review. After reviewing the administrative record, the chancery court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the administrative decision for further proceedings. We affirm.

In this termination of parental rights case, Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by failure to support and by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(a)(iv); and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g)(3)(A). Father also appeals the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Department of Children’s Services does not defend the ground of persistence of conditions, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights on that ground. We affirm the termination of Appellant’s parental rights on all remaining grounds, and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

Following a conviction for theft of property, the Defendant, Tanya Dawn Everett, was sentenced to a term of four years and placed on probation. Thereafter, the Blount County Circuit Court found that the Defendant violated the terms of her probation by failing to report and by committing new criminal offenses. As a consequence, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of her original sentence in custody. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Calvin Sanchez Amos, Defendant, was indicted for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest. Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and proceeded to trial on the remaining charges. A jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offenses of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and attempted possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant agreed to an effective sentence of 12 years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a video from Defendant’s phone in which he is seen cooking crack cocaine. After a full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a challenge to a chancery court’s granting of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement related to litigation over the partition of family-owned property. The appellant is incarcerated, which caused complications for all parties in efficiently resolving their dispute. The chancellor concluded the appellant was bound by the settlement reached by his agent, who was acting with both actual and apparent authority. On appeal, the appellant contends the chancellor erred in finding his agent had actual and apparent authority to agree to a settlement on his behalf. We conclude that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the chancellor erred in finding the appellant conferred actual authority upon his agent; accordingly, we affirm the chancery court’s granting of the appellees’ motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Lester Strickland, appeals from the revocation of his probationary sentence for aggravated burglary. The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in fully revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm.

This appeal challenges a grant of summary judgment to an insurance company on a breach of contract claim for failing to honor a life insurance policy.  The chancery court concluded the policy was void because of misrepresentations made by the decedent in obtaining coverage. The beneficiary, the spouse of the decedent, argues disputed facts exist both as to whether any misrepresentations were made and whether any of the purported misrepresentations increased the insurer’s risk of loss.  Accordingly, the beneficiary contends that the chancellor erred in awarding summary judgment.  We find no error and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

Petitioner, Marlez Wilson a/k/a, Marlez Wright, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant filed for disability benefits with the Appellee, Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (“CFPPF”). The CFPPF board denied Appellant’s application by letter dated October 27, 2020. On June 28, 2021, Appellant filed a request for rehearing with the board; the board denied rehearing by letter dated August 19, 2021. On September 10, 2021, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review in the trial court, and the CFPPF moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02. The trial court held that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) applied and further held that the board’s October 27, 2020 was not compliant with the UAPA requirements for final orders. Nonetheless, the trial court held that the October 27, 2020 letter was a final order so as to trigger the sixty-day time for filing for review in the trial court and dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Because the October 27, 2020 order was not UAPA-compliant, it did not constitute a final order so as to trigger the running of the sixty-day statute of limitations. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Reversed and remanded.

Petitioner, Glenn Sewell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Karen Thomas, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction of aggravated stalking, alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not object to the State presenting rebuttal testimony at trial or the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the rebuttal testimony. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by wanton disregard, (2) persistence of conditions, (3) sentenced to two or more years’ imprisonment for conduct against a child, (4) incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years, and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility.  She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child.  Finding that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact for the failure to manifest an ability and willingness ground, we vacate that termination ground.  We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects.

A reverse mortgage borrower died.  The administrator of his estate petitioned the probate court to enjoin the lender from foreclosing and to set aside the loan and mortgage based on lack of capacity and fraud.  While the injunction against the lender was in place, the mortgaged property was sold.  On the administrator’s motion, the probate court ordered the administrator to escrow the payoff amount for the reverse mortgage pending the outcome of the litigation.  After a bench trial, the probate court dismissed the estate’s claims against the lender.  The administrator then asked the court for leave to release the escrowed funds in an amount equal to a payoff provided by the lender shortly before the sale.  The lender objected because the sale had occurred over four years before.  The lender requested payment of interest accruing since the sale and recovery of its attorney’s fees and costs.  The probate court sided with the administrator and denied the lender’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.  We affirm.

This appeal involves a long-running dispute between two groups of property owners in the real estate community development of Renegade Mountain over composition of the board of directors and resultant control of the community organization. Plaintiffs, members of the Renegade Mountain Community Club, Inc. (“RMCC”), a homeowner’s association, brought this action in 2011, seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their status as directors and officers of RMCC. The Defendants contested the validity of the election at which Plaintiffs were allegedly elected. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration of whether the purported developer possessed developer’s rights. After two prior appeals and a subsequent retrial, the trial court held that Defendant Moy Toy, Inc., a property owner, does not have developer’s rights. The trial court further ruled that Plaintiffs were properly elected as members of RMCC’s board and enforced an easement of enjoyment to use certain property in the development that was designated as “common areas,” in favor of Plaintiffs and all other members of RMCC. Defendants appeal. We vacate the trial court’s findings that the parties stipulated that the old golf course property was not “common property,” and that Plaintiffs “have no interest” in it because the parties agreed and stipulated only that the old golf course property was “not an issue” in this case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children.  Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the children on multiple bases.  Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This appeal involves a counterclaim asserting defamation filed by the original defendant, a construction company, concerning statements that the original plaintiffs/homeowners made online and to third parties that were allegedly damaging to the construction company’s reputation. The homeowners sought dismissal of the defamation claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-101, et seq., known as the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the homeowners’ motion to dismiss and ultimately entered judgment against them. The homeowners have appealed solely the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. Determining that the trial court should have analyzed the motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of the TPPA rather than applying a traditional Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 analysis, we vacate the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. We also vacate the trial court’s monetary award to the defendant construction company and remand that issue for further consideration once the motion to dismiss has been properly adjudicated.

Following a trial, a Davidson County jury convicted Defendant, James Lee Simpson, of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault resulting in death, and felon in possession of a firearm, for which he received a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by providing incomplete and erroneous jury instructions on the issue of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by preventing Defendant from cross-examining a witness regarding alleged prior acts of violence by the victims in violation of both Tennessee Rule of Evidence 405 and Defendant’s right to confrontation; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant; (5) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault resulting in death; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to cross-examine a witness regarding Defendant’s prior conviction for possessing a firearm after concluding that Defendant had “opened the door” to the cross-examination. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

Patient, by next of kin, sued hospital alleging negligence during his treatment. Trial court granted hospital’s motion to dismiss based on patient’s failure to file the complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Patient appealed the dismissal. Because the trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations commenced running when the patient was discharged, we affirm.