APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her three children on the grounds of: 1) abandonment for failure to support under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113-(g)(1); 2) failure to comply with the permanency plan under section 36-1-113(g)(2); 3) persistence of the conditions that led to removal of the children under section 36-1-13(g)(3); and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody under section 36-1-113(g)(14). Mother’s parental rights to her youngest child were terminated on the additional ground of severe child abuse under section 36-1-113(g)(4). After determining that Father had failed to legitimate his children, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) for failure to support; failure to visit; failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody; and a danger of risk of substantial harm. The trial court also determined that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee appeals the trial court’s dismissal of two counts of animal cruelty on the basis that an emu met the statutory definition of livestock under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-201, that the animal control officer was not a statutorily qualified livestock examiner and that the animal control officer’s consultation with a licensed veterinarian failed to satisfy the requirements of the livestock examination statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-211. We conclude that the emu was not livestock under the plain language of the statute and thus no livestock examination was required to proceed with charges under the animal cruelty statute. See T.C.A. § 39-14-202(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of counts one and two and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal concerns a zoning decision.  The Sporting Club of Tennessee, Inc. (“the Sporting Club”) filed an application with Marshall County, Tennessee for a special exception for a private park.  The club was to be situated on 285 acres of property and would feature a number of recreational activities like shooting.  It would have 150 members and corporate members along with their families and guests.  After a hearing, the Marshall County Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”) denied the Sporting Club’s application on grounds that the Sporting Club would not be low-impact, or passive, with respect to its surroundings.  The Sporting Club filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Marshall County (“the Trial Court”).  The Trial Court upheld the Board’s decision.  The Sporting Club appeals to this Court.  We conclude that the Board’s decision was supported by material evidence—namely, evidence concerning the Sporting Club’s 150 members and guests and the likely impact they would have on the property’s surroundings.  The Board’s decision neither was arbitrary, capricious, nor illegal.  We affirm.

A Bradley County jury convicted the Defendant, Horatio Derelle Burford, of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III offender to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to: (1) properly limit the State’s evidence about prior injuries to the victim; and (2) preclude the State from introducing improper photographic evidence during opening argument. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Leon Denton, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Deangelo Monteze Moody, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis and the summary dismissal of his amended petition for post-conviction relief. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal following the trial court’s dismissal of a legal malpractice complaint predicated upon actions allegedly taken by the Defendants in connection with a prior class action proceeding. In light of its dismissal of the Plaintiff’s complaint, the trial court ruled that a “derivative” third-party complaint asserted by the Defendants should also be dismissed. Whereas the Plaintiff challenges the dismissal of her complaint, the Defendants submit that, if the order dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint is reversed, the order dismissing their third-party complaint should also be reversed. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse, in part, the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims, reverse the dismissal of the third-party complaint, and remand for further proceedings.

Charles Person-Gibson, Defendant, was indicted in a five-count indictment for first degree murder, felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During trial, Defendant sought a mistrial on the basis that the State elicited improper testimony about Defendant’s criminal record. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Defendant guilty of first degree murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant was found not guilty of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the first degree murder conviction. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of life in prison plus twenty years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter to the trial court for amendment of the judgment forms to reflect the sentence as announced by the trial court at the sentencing hearing.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Zaciaro Moore, of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery based upon the State’s failure to prove the element of serious bodily injury. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, and we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. However, we must remand for a clerical error in the judgment form for theft of property in Count 3.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

An inmate appeals the Claims Commission’s dismissal of his claim. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within the time permitted by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the grounds of (1) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, (2) persistence of conditions, (3) severe child abuse, and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child. She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. We vacate the substantial noncompliance ground and reverse the persistence of conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility grounds. Concluding that the record does not contain clear and convincing proof that termination is in the best interest of the child, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

Defendant, Ryan Benito Calderon Sotelo, was convicted after a jury trial of the sale of twenty-six grams or more of cocaine and subsequently sentenced to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.1 The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Dwight Twarn Champion, was tried jointly with his co-defendant and was convicted of facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with a weight of 0.5 grams or more with intent to sell, facilitation of criminal attempt of possession of cocaine with a weight of 0.5 grams or more with intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana, for which he received an effective twelve-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to suppress, interview one of the State’s witnesses, investigate the precise location of a black plastic bag containing drugs found outside the home, cross-examine one of the State’s witnesses, and file a motion to sever the Petitioner’s trial from his co-defendant’s trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Sarioglo Serghei, Defendant, was issued a citation alleging that he “failed to move over for officer traffic stop (lights on).” Following a bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty of violating Tennessee Code Annotated Section 55-8-132(b), a Class B misdemeanor, and imposed a sentence of thirty days suspended to unsupervised probation and a fine of one hundred dollars. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we determine that Defendant had limited English proficiency, that the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 42, and that proceeding with the trial when Defendant did not have the necessary means to communicate violated his constitutional right to testify and to be heard. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion

The Petitioner, Jenelle Leigh Potter, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. She claims that trial counsel was ineffective due to trial counsel’s failure to timely file a motion for new trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of the mother’s petition to relocate with her minor child.  We affirm the trial court’s decision.

This case involves two creditors, each claiming a superior interest in the same motor vehicle, which was pledged as collateral for two separate loans by its owner. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the creditor that had perfected its title lien on the vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a consolidated appeal from the trial court’s attorney fee award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c), which concerns awards of the costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees to parties who prevail on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging various claims against the defendants. Upon the defendants’ motion, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on December 3, 2018. The plaintiff took a timely appeal, and we affirmed the judgment of dismissal in full. We remanded the case for collection of the costs below. After the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review, the defendants, for the first time, moved for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) in the trial court. The trial court granted that motion and awarded the statutory maximum amount of fees to the defendants. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs. 

The appellant challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her petition for order of protection against her husband. Following a hearing where both parties testified, the trial court did not find appellant’s testimony credible and dismissed her petition. We affirm.

In this appeal, we clarify the appropriate standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object but later raises the claim in a motion for a new trial.  Tyler Ward Enix was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and especially aggravated robbery for the 2015 killing of Kimberly Enix.  Mr. Enix filed a motion for a new trial challenging his convictions.  As relevant to this appeal, he alleged that four instances of improper prosecutorial closing argument, which were not contemporaneously objected to at trial, constitute reversible error.  The trial court denied his motion for new trial.  The Court of Criminal Appeals, reviewing the claims under the plain error doctrine, affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Mr. Enix sought permission to appeal, arguing that this Court should employ plenary review to address his claims because they were included in his motion for a new trial.  We granted permission to appeal and now hold that plain error review is the appropriate standard, and, furthermore, that Mr. Enix is not entitled to relief.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals for the separate reasons stated herein.

This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition to modify a parenting plan, specifically the parenting schedule, and a counter-petition to modify child support. The parties were divorced in Kentucky shortly after the father was diagnosed with a mental illness in 2012. The separation agreement gave the father visitation “as agreed upon by the parties to be supervised at all times by [the father]’s parents.” Over the next four years, the father enjoyed frequent and liberal visitation with the child. This arrangement continued until the grandparents took the father to the child’s school performance. The mother believed the father’s presence was “wildly inappropriate” due to his mental health issues. She subsequently refused the grandparents’ requests to see the child, effectively depriving the father of any parenting time with the child. The father then commenced this action by petitioning to modify the parenting plan so that he would have regularly scheduled parenting time that was not subject to the mother’s unilateral approval. The mother opposed the father’s petition and filed a counter-petition to modify his child support obligation and to award an arrearage judgment for unpaid child support. After a trial, the court found that the mother’s unilateral termination of the father’s visitation was a material change in circumstance and that scheduled, supervised visitation with the father was in the child’s best interest. The trial court also retroactively modified the father’s child support obligation and awarded an arrearage judgment of $7,000 in favor of the mother for unpaid child support. The court denied the mother’s request for pre- and postjudgment interest because the mother’s “own actions . . . caused a lengthy delay to the conclusion of the[] proceedings.” The mother raises several issues on appeal. She contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was no evidence that the mother, the child, and the father lived in Tennessee for six months before the father’s petition. She also contends that her refusal to allow the grandparents to see the child was not a material change in circumstance. Further, she contends the trial court erred in its calculation of the father’s child support obligation and in failing to award pre- and post-judgment interest under Kentucky law. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court in all regards except its denial of interest and the effective date of the modified support order. Therefore, the judgment of the trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.