APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The plaintiff brought suit against a manufacturer of windows and doors for allegedly supplying defective products which allowed substantial leaks into her dwelling and caused rotting because of excessive moisture. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court denied the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act but awarded judgment to the plaintiff on her claim that the defendant supplied defective doors and windows. Based upon our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Finding that the plaintiff did not provide notice to the defendant of its allegedly defective product within the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse the award of damages to the plaintiff and dismiss her complaint.

This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively.

This appeal stems from a post-divorce custody modification in which the father sought increased parenting time with his minor daughter, I.B. The trial court agreed with the father that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that a modification of the father’s parenting time was warranted. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00, or roughly half, of his attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court proceedings. The mother appeals the trial court’s decision. Because the father was, for the most part, the prevailing party at trial and proceeded in good faith, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a portion of his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to attorney’s fees. However, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s final judgment placing a price cap on the minor child’s therapy fees. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Finally, we decline to award either party their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint.

The petitioner, Jaselyn Grant, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief,
which petition challenged her convictions of second degree murder, reckless
endangerment, and aggravated assault, alleging that she was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel at trial. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that she is
entitled to post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest
children. As grounds for termination the trial court found abandonment for failure to
provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent
conditions, severe child abuse, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume
custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of both children.
We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the
grounds for termination and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

I agree with the majority’s resolution of every issue in this case but one: the effect of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The majority concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree murder is not error because the evidence in the record does not support that offense. Because I find the evidence can indeed support a conviction of seconddegree murder, I respectfully dissent.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby
County convictions for two counts of conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of
methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone and two counts of
possession of 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in a
drug-free zone. Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel
based upon counsel’s failure to: (1) object to irrelevant and prejudicial text messages
introduced at trial; (2) file a Bruton motion; (3) contest that Petitioner tracked the package
containing the methamphetamine; (4) adequately prepare for trial; (5) object when the State
argued that Petitioner’s silence implied guilt; (6) object when the prosecutor “testified
during closing argument in order to bolster his own credibility”; and (7) object when the
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented evidence during closing argument. Petitioner
further asserts that she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough
review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit.

It is apparent that this Court has based its finding that Mr. Brooks is willfully and voluntarily underemployed simply on the fact that he, at one time, was more lucratively employed. Simply because a parent is not as lucratively employed as during the marriage, or for a time thereafter, no automatic inference that he or she is willfully and voluntarily underemployed should be drawn. We must remain cognizant of a parent’s right as a citizen to the pursuit of happiness and to the freedom to make reasonable employment decisions, while at the same time heeding the duty to support.

This is a parental rights termination case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile
Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Trent W. (“Father”) to his minor children
Klowii W. and Mariah W. (collectively, “the Children”). After a hearing, the Juvenile
Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children. The Juvenile
Court found by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven the grounds of
abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the
permanency plans, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody. The Juvenile Court also found by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals,
arguing that DCS failed to prove either grounds or best interest. We find that all four
grounds found by the Juvenile Court were proven by the requisite clear and convincing
evidence. We further find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Juvenile Court, that
termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.