APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Terrance Holliday, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by denying his
motion for recusal and by finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Based
on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Larry E. Orozco, was originally convicted of two counts of attempted
second-degree murder, two counts of unlawful employment of a firearm during an attempt
to commit a dangerous felony, and seven counts of reckless endangerment committed with
a deadly weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-one years’
imprisonment. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal; however, appellate
review of his sentence was waived because the record did not include the sentencing
hearing transcript. The Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court granted a delayed appeal. The
Defendant now challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence and contends the trial
court erred in finding that he was a dangerous offender, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
115(b)(4), and in failing to make the necessary findings pursuant to State v. Wilkerson,
905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Upon our review, we detect clerical errors in the judgments
and remand for entry of corrected judgments in counts 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 19. In all
other respects, we affirm.

The Petitioner, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Upon our review, we affirm.

Loring Justice (“Justice”) filed a complaint against Kim Nelson (“Nelson”); David Valone (“Valone”) and the Law
Office of David Valone (collectively, “Valone Defendants”); and Martha Meares (“Meares”), and Meares and
Associates and/or Meares and Dillard (collectively, “Meares Defendants”), (collectively, “Defendants”) in the
Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Justice alleged, inter alia, wrongful execution of judgment and
abuse of process. Nelson filed a motion to classify Justice’s action as an abusive civil action (“ACA”) pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101, et seq. The Trial Court granted Nelson’s ACA motion, and Justice appealed. Having
reviewed the evidence, we affirm, albeit for somewhat different reasons than provided by the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Denver Christian Smith, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal
Court jury of first degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, and attempted
carjacking. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree
murder), 39-13-210 (2014) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder), 39-13-404
(2018) (carjacking), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt). On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress
his statements to the police and (2) no reasonable trier of fact could find that the Defendant
failed to establish his insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute over recovery under the Tennessee uninsured/underinsured motorist statutory scheme. The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against the defendant driver and served notice on their own insurance carrier. The plaintiffs also served notice on the insurance carrier covering the borrowed vehicle that the plaintiffs had been utilizing when the accident occurred. The plaintiffs’ insurer entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs for $50,000 each, an amount that equaled the policy limit of the uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policy covering the borrowed vehicle. The defendant driver’s insurer also entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs, paying them $30,000 each. The uninsured motorist carrier covering the borrowed vehicle filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier upon concluding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201(b)(3)(D) and the policy covering the borrowed vehicle limited the plaintiffs’ recovery via judgment to an amount no greater than the policy providing the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Clardy’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis without conducting a hearing on the merits because the petition was untimely and was not entitled to tolling. I also agree with the majority that the trial court handled and decided this case exactly as it should have. Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

In this parental termination case, the paternal grandparents filed a petition to terminate the
mother’s parental rights to her four children, alleging several grounds for termination. The
trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of
the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings,
the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. We affirm the trial
court’s finding that the termination ground of abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)(c) has been proven and that
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly,
we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for race discrimination for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

The plaintiff filed a health care liability action without a certificate of good faith. When the defendant moved to dismiss, the plaintiff asserted that the certificate was unnecessary because the common knowledge exception applied. He also contended that his noncompliance should be excused based on the defendant’s failure to timely provide medical records and/or for extraordinary cause. The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and dismissed the action with prejudice. We affirm.

The trial court entered a permanent parenting plan in 2014 that governed the parties’ custody arrangement for nine years. In 2022, the child’s father petitioned the juvenile court for a modification of the parenting plan. During the pendency of the modification petition, he also filed a motion for a restraining order to prevent the child’s mother from removing the parties’ daughter from his custody, which was granted. After a hearing on the modification petition, the court found a material change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification and that modification of the custody arrangement was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

In 2020, the Petitioner, Ronnie Dale Whitener, pleaded guilty to one count of the sale of and one count of the possession of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, as well as one count of theft and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. In March 2023, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which is not included in the record. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This appeal concerns a dispute over insurance coverage. After a fire loss, the insured brought a breach of contract claim against her insurer. The insurer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the insured was not entitled to coverage for additional living expenses because she did not have an insurable interest in the property and that the insured’s contents coverage claim was precluded under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The insured appeals. We reverse and remand.

The prisoner in this case filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis long after expiration of the one-year limitations period and sought tolling of the statute of limitations. The petition was filed under the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations adopted by this Court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). The coram nobis court held a hearing on whether to toll the statute of limitations. It accepted the factual allegations in the coram nobis petition as true, but determined that the new evidence did not show that the petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted, so he was not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the coram nobis court on the tolling exception, reversed the dismissal for untimeliness, and remanded for a hearing on the allegations in the petition. On appeal, we hold that if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is not timely filed and seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, it must be based on new evidence, discovered after expiration of the limitations period, that clearly and convincingly shows that the petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime, i.e., that the petitioner did not commit the crime. To obtain tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations, the prisoner must file the petition no more than one year after he discovers the new evidence of actual innocence. From our review of the record, we agree with the analysis and conclusion of the coram nobis court and find no error. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the decision of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition as untimely.

Petitioner, John David Smartt, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to prepare him to testify and failing to object to testimony concerning a recorded phone call between the victim (“J.S.”)¹ and Petitioner. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In an appeal from a general sessions court judgment, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages for a misrepresentation by a car dealer, declined to award treble damages, and awarded the plaintiffs only a portion of their attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal. We vacate the denial of treble damages, but otherwise affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this post-divorce dispute over child support, the mother has appealed an order striking her pleadings and granting the father a default judgment as to his counter-petition. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The company holding developer’s rights to a subdivision and the company’s principal member used the developer’s rights to unilaterally remove a board member from the board of the subdivision’s homeowners’ association. The aggrieved board member and his wife filed suit, asking for an injunction allowing the plaintiff to remain a board member. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction and later held that the defendant company lacked the authority to remove the plaintiff as a board member. The trial court reasoned that the bylaw on which the company relied in removing the board member was contrary to state law and improper. Defendants appealed to this Court. We reverse in part and affirm in part, affirming the trial court’s ultimate ruling that the plaintiff is entitled to his seat on the homeowners’ association board.

In this divorce action, the wife contends that the trial court inequitably divided the parties’
marital estate. The trial court awarded the husband the divorce on the ground of
irreconcilable differences, classified the parties’ assets as separate or marital, and then
divided the parties’ marital estate. The court also determined that an award of alimony to
the wife was not appropriate and further denied the wife’s motion for civil contempt. This
appeal by the wife followed. Due to the wife’s failure to file a table that lists “all properties
and debts considered by the trial court, including: (1) all separate property, (2) all marital
property, and (3) all separate and marital debts,” as required by Court of Appeals Rule 7,
along with other deficiencies in the wife’s brief, we conclude that she has waived her issues
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After many years of contentious post-divorce litigation, the trial court ordered the court clerk’s office to distribute property-sale proceeds to the parties. The trial court also ordered that the wife’s portion of the sale proceeds be taxed in an amount sufficient to satisfy a previous sanctions award against the wife and an award of attorney’s fees to the husband. The wife appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Knox County jury convicted Defendant of Class E felony theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less $2,500. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and that the trial court erred in denying Defendant the right to enter relevant evidence. Following our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Defendant guilty and that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because it was not properly authenticated. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order of restitution. The Appellant asserts error,
and the State concedes. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the
case for a new restitution hearing.

In this case, an attorney appeals the recommended sanction of disbarment after three criminal convictions. The attorney was convicted by a jury of two counts of subornation of aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, all Class E felony offenses and serious crimes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22. All three criminal convictions arose out of the attorney’s conduct in representing a client. In the ensuing disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel recommended disbarment. The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the chancery court, which affirmed. The attorney appealed to this Court. On appeal, the attorney argues the hearing panel should have reviewed similar cases of attorney misconduct where a suspension was imposed, and that he should be suspended based on the sanction imposed in those cases. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panels and trial courts considering attorney discipline promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by anchoring their decisions on punishment to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Rule 9 does not give either hearing panels or trial courts authority in attorney disciplinary cases to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. The Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective from seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—whether appealed or not—puts it in the best position to consider comparative cases for the sake of uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee. In this case, considering the nature of the attorney’s misconduct, no comparable case convinces us that suspension, rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment.

This is a child custody matter involving the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-201, et seq. (“the UCCJEA”). Leslie Burke and Melissa Burke (“the Burkes”) received temporary custody pending adoption of the minor child Jane Doe (“the Child”) from an Indiana court (“the Indiana Court”). The Burkes then brought the Child to Tennessee. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) later filed a dependency and neglect action in the Juvenile Court for Greene County (“the Juvenile Court”). DCS alleged that the Child disclosed having been sexually abused in previous adoptive homes, and that the Burkes were not cooperating with individual therapy for the Child. The Juvenile Court ordered the Child’s removal into DCS custody. The Child’s legal parents in Indiana surrendered their parental rights. DCS moved for guardianship of the Child in the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Circuit Court”), which the Circuit Court granted. The Burkes sued DCS2 in the Circuit Court challenging the legal parents’ surrender of their parental rights and the Circuit Court’s award of full guardianship to DCS. The Burkes and DCS filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court ruled in favor of DCS, dismissing the Burkes’ complaint. The Burkes appeal, arguing that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction even though the Indiana Court expressly ceded jurisdiction to Tennessee. We hold, inter alia, that Indiana relinquished its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. We affirm

The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her five children on multiple grounds. The trial court found that grounds had been proven and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The mother of all five children appeals. For the reasons stated below, we vacate that part of the judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights to Destiney S. and Serenity S. because they attained the age of majority prior to the entry of the final judgment. As for the three youngest children, Aurora R., Kanan R., and Kyaion R., we affirm the trial court’s determination that grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights were proven and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in their best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights to Aurora R., Kanan R., and Kyaion R.